Descriptif
Prerequisite: ECO201
In Advanced Microeconomics (ECO 301), we build on the ECO 201 course to go beyond the competitive equilibrium setting and elicit new causes of market failures. We aim to study how the pre-sence of incomplete and asymmetric information affects the standard analysis of microeconomic theory. The starting point is that the presence of asymmetric information leads to market failures and open the question of how to regulate and appropriately design markets to solve or reduce these failures. We will present the basics of two important theories and methods which have been the core of the modern microeconomic analysis since 1970: the signaling games and the mechanism design. The students will learn the tools to analyze markets and interactions in the presence of incomplete and asymmetric information. They will learn how to develop policy tools and how to design markets to mitigate the issues induced by the information structure.
Diplôme(s) concerné(s)
Parcours de rattachement
Pour les étudiants du diplôme Bachelor of Science de l'Ecole polytechnique
Vous devez avoir validé l'équation suivante : UE ECO201
Format des notes
Numérique sur 20Littérale/grade américainPour les étudiants du diplôme Programmes d'échange internationaux
Pour les étudiants du diplôme Bachelor of Science de l'Ecole polytechnique
Le rattrapage est autorisé (Note de rattrapage conservée écrêtée à une note seuil de 10)- Crédits ECTS acquis : 5 ECTS
La note obtenue rentre dans le calcul de votre GPA.
Programme détaillé
We will cover the following topics:
❯ Chapter 1: Game theory under incomplete information (1)
❯ Chapter 2: Asymmetric Information, Signaling and Application to the Insurance Market (2)
❯ Chapter 3: The Principal Agent Model (3)
❯ Chapter 4: Auctions and Mechanism Design (4)
❯ Chapter 5: Market Design and Matching The mathematical treatments are rigorous but not as much as at the graduate level. This course will be thus most useful as a preparation for formal graduate studies in Economics
Textbooks:
❯ Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT press (Chap 2 & 11)
❯ Jehle, G. A., & Reny, P. J. (2001). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Chap 7, 8 & 9)
❯ Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2009). The theory of incentives: the principalagent model. Princeton university press (Chap 2 & 4)
❯ Krishna, V. (2009). Auction theory. Academic press (Chap 2 & 5)