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Programme d'approfondissement - ECO_52660_EP : Microéconomie II

Domaine > Economie.

Descriptif

Microeconomics II is an advanced microeconomics course focused on strategic interactions and information. The course revolves around strategic analysis through the fundamental tools of Game Theory, both in normal and extensive form, to repeated games, games of incomplete information, repeated games and mechanism design.

Microeconomics II is a meticulously designed course that offers an in-depth investigation into the intricacies of strategic interactions and information in microeconomics. The curriculum encompasses a broad array of topics including equilibrium concepts, models of imperfect competition, extensive form games, Bayesian games, and an introduction to mechanism design. This course is instrumental in equipping students with a nuanced understanding of microeconomic theory, thus enabling them to analyze and interpret complex economic phenomena effectively.

 

Books:

“A Course in Game Theory” by Osborne and Rubinstein, MIT Press. Chapters 1-3, 6, 8, 11, 12.

“Microeconomics” by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Chapters 7, 8, 9, 13, 14.

“Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict” by Roger Myerson.

Objectifs pédagogiques

  1. Comprehension: Students will develop a deep understanding of various key concepts in advanced microeconomics, such as normal form games, equilibrium concepts, imperfect competition models, and Bayesian games.
  2. Application: Students will learn to apply theoretical principles to real-world economic situations. This includes using different equilibrium concepts, applying game theory in various contexts, and understanding the implications of imperfect competition.
  3. Critical thinking: Students will enhance their ability to critically analyze economic phenomena using the tools and concepts taught in the course. This involves evaluating the outcomes of strategic interactions and understanding the effects of information asymmetry.
  4. Problem-solving: Students will build their problem-solving skills, particularly in dealing with economic situations that involve strategic interactions and imperfect information.
  5. Communication: Students will improve their ability to articulate complex microeconomic concepts and arguments effectively, both in written form and verbally.

 

These objectives aim to provide students with a comprehensive understanding of advanced microeconomics, enhancing their analytical skills and preparing them for future academic or professional pursuits in the field.

49.5 heures en présentiel

effectifs minimal / maximal:

/72

Diplôme(s) concerné(s)

Parcours de rattachement

Pour les étudiants du diplôme M1 MiE - Master en Economie

Microeconomics 1

Format des notes

Numérique sur 20

Littérale/grade réduit

Pour les étudiants du diplôme M1 MiE - Master en Economie

Vos modalités d'acquisition :

● Sans document

written exam closed book 

Le rattrapage est autorisé (Note de rattrapage conservée)
    L'UE est acquise si Note finale >= 10
    • Crédits ECTS acquis : 8 ECTS

    Pour les étudiants du diplôme Programmes d'échange internationaux

    Le rattrapage est autorisé (Note de rattrapage conservée)
      L'UE est acquise si note finale transposée >= C
      • Crédits ECTS acquis : 5 ECTS

      Pour les étudiants du diplôme Titre d’Ingénieur diplômé de l’École polytechnique

      Le rattrapage est autorisé (Note de rattrapage conservée)
        L'UE est acquise si note finale transposée >= C
        • Crédits ECTS acquis : 5 ECTS

        La note obtenue rentre dans le calcul de votre GPA.

        Programme détaillé

        Principal Items:

        • Normal form games, pure and mixed strategies, equilibrium concepts (dominance, rationalizability, Nash)
        • Imperfect competition (Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling)
        • Extensive form games with perfect information, backward induction
        • Extensive form games with imperfect information (information sets), normal form representation
        • Bayesian games, auctions, adverse selection, signaling, screening
        • Equilibrium refinements (Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium)
        • Introduction to mechanism design
        • Contract theory, principal agent models, risk sharing

        Mots clés

        economics, game theory
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