Descriptif

This course introduces market design, where we use ideas from economics, mathematics, and computer science to
design rules for allocating scarce resources. Instead of only analyzing existing markets, we ask how to design new
institutions and platforms that perform well in practice.
We focus on two central topics: matching and auctions. For matching, we use applications such as school choice,
medical residency matching, and kidney exchange to build intuition. We then study simple matching algorithms (e.g.,
deferred acceptance and top trading cycles) and their properties, including stability, fairness, efficiency, and incentive
issues. For auctions, we begin with familiar formats such as English, first-price, and second-price auctions and connect
them to real markets. We then discuss auctions for multiple objects, with examples from online advertising and spectrum
allocation used by governments and platforms.
Throughout the course, we move from applications and examples to the underlying game-theoretic and mechanismdesign
ideas. The course mixes intuitive examples, light formal analysis, and algorithmic descriptions that connect to
students’ mathematical and computing background.
By the end of the course, students should be able to:
• model basic allocation problems and state the relevant constraints and objectives,
• understand the logic of widely used real-world mechanisms,
• critically evaluate design trade-offs (e.g., stability, efficiency, fairness, incentives) in matching and auction settings.
Textbook. There is no required textbook. Slides and handouts will be provided. For students who would like a book,
a good reference is Guillaume Haeringer, Market Design: Auctions and Matching (MIT Press).